This paper presents a general mean-field game (GMFG) framework for simultaneous learning and decision-making in stochastic games with a large population. It first establishes the existence of a unique Nash Equilibrium to this GMFG, and demonstrates that naively combining Qlearning with the fixed-point approach in classical MFGs yields unstable algorithms. It then proposes value-based and policy-based reinforcement learning algorithms (GMF-P and GMF-P respectively) with smoothed policies, with analysis of convergence property and computational complexity. The experiments on repeated Ad auction problems demonstrate that GMF-V-Q, a specific GMF-V algorithm based on Q-learning, is efficient and robust in terms of convergence and learning accuracy. Moreover, its performance is superior in convergence, stability, and learning ability, when compared with existing algorithms for multi-agent reinforcement learning.
Introduction
Motivating example. This paper is motivated by the following Ad auction problem for an advertiser. An Ad auction is a stochastic game on an Ad exchange platform among a large number of players, the advertisers. In between the time a web user requests a page and the time the page is displayed, usually within a millisecond, a Vickrey-type of second-best-price auction is run to incentivize interested advertisers to bid for an Ad slot to display advertisement. Each advertiser has limited information before each bid: first, her own valuation for a slot depends on an unknown conversion of clicks for the item; secondly, she, should she win the bid, only knows the reward after the user's activities on the website are finished. In addition, she has a budget constraint in this repeated auction.
The question is, how should she bid in this online sequential repeated game when there is a large population of bidders competing on the Ad platform, with unknown distributions of the conversion of clicks and rewards?
Besides the Ad auction, there are many real-world problems involving a large number of players and unknown systems. Examples include massive multi-player online role-playing games [30] , high frequency tradings [35] , and the sharing economy [24] .
Our work. Motivated by these problems, we consider a general framework of simultaneous learning and decision-making in stochastic games with a large population. We formulate a general mean-fieldgame (GMFG) with incorporation of action distributions, (randomized) relaxed policies, and with unknown rewards and dynamics. This general framework can also be viewed as a generalized version of MFGs of McKean-Vlasov type [1] , which is a different paradigm from the classical MFG. It is also beyond the scope of the existing reinforcement learning (RL) framework for Markov decision problem (MDP) with unknown distributions, as MDP is technically equivalent to a single player stochastic game.
On the theory front, this general framework differs from all existing MFGs. We establish under appropriate technical conditions, the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium (NE) to this GMFG. On the computational front, we show that naively combining reinforcement learning with the three-step fixed-point approach in classical MFGs yields unstable algorithms. We then propose both value based and policy based reinforcement learning algorithms with smoothed policies (GMF-V and GMF-P respectively), establish the convergence property and analyze the computational complexity. Finally, we apply GMF-V-Q, a specific Q-learning based GMF-V algorithm to the Ad auction problem, where this GMF-V-Q algorithm demonstrates its efficiency and robustness in terms of convergence and learning. Moreover, its performance is superior, when compared with existing algorithms for multi-agent reinforcement learning, in terms of convergence, stability, and learning accuracy.
Related works. On learning large population games with mean-field approximations, [52] focuses on inverse reinforcement learning for MFGs without decision making, [53] studies an MARL problem with a first-order mean-field approximation term modeling the interaction between one player and all the other finite players, and [33] and [54] consider model-based adaptive learning for MFGs in specific models (e.g., linear-quadratic and oscillator games). More recently, [38] studies the local convergence of actor-critic algorithms on finite time horizon MFGs, and [48] proposes a policy-gradient based algorithm and analyzes the so-called local NE for reinforcement learning in infinite time horizon MFGs. For learning large population games without mean-field approximation, see [25, 32] and the references therein. In the specific topic of learning auctions with a large number of advertisers, [8] and [31] explore reinforcement learning techniques to search for social optimal solutions with real-word data, and [29] uses MFGs to model the auction system with unknown conversion of clicks within a Bayesian framework.
However, none of these works consider the problem of simultaneous learning and decision-making in a general MFG framework. Neither do they establish the existence and uniqueness of the (global) NE, nor do they present model-free learning algorithms with complexity analysis and convergence to the NE. Note that in principle, global results are harder to obtain compared to local results.
We remark that following the conference version [22] of the current paper (which focuses only on GMF-V-Q), various efforts have been made to extend reinforcement learning of MFGs to more general settings with continuous states and actions [2, 12, 14] . In the meantime, the idea of simultaneous learning and decision making with mean-field interaction has also motivated the works on collaborative games with social optimal solution [9, 10, 19, 20, 37] . are positive integers, and S and A are compact (for example, finite) state space and action space, respectively. Given the current state profile of N -players s t = (s 1 t , . . . , s N t ) ∈ S N and the action a i t , player i will receive a reward r i (s t , a i t ) and her state will change to s i t+1 according to a transition probability function P i (s t , a i t ). A Markovian game further restricts the admissible policy/control for player i to be of the form a i t = π i t (s t ). That is, π i t : S N → P(A) maps each state profile s ∈ S N to a randomized action, with P(X ) the space of probability measures on space X . The accumulated reward (a.k.a. the value function) for player i, given the initial state profile s and the policy profile sequence π π π := {π π π t } ∞ t=0 with π π π t = (π 1 t , . . . , π N t ), is then defined as
where γ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, a i t ∼ π i t (s t ), and s i t+1 ∼ P i (s t , a i t ). The goal of each player is to maximize her value function over all admissible policy sequences.
In general, this type of stochastic N -player game is notoriously hard to analyze, especially when N is large [41] . Mean field game (MFG), pioneered by [28] and [34] in the continuous settings and later developed in [6, 18, 27, 36, 45] for discrete settings, provides an ingenious and tractable aggregation approach to approximate the otherwise challenging N -player stochastic games. The basic idea for an MFG goes as follows. Assume all players are identical, indistinguishable and interchangeable, when N → ∞, one can view the limit of other players' states s
Due to the homogeneity of the players, one can then focus on a single (representative) player. That is, in an MFG, one may consider instead the following optimization problem, maximize π π π V (s, π π π, µ µ µ)
where π π π := {π t } ∞ t=0 denotes the policy sequence and µ µ µ := {µ t } ∞ t=0 the distribution flow. In this MFG setting, at time t, after the representative player chooses her action a t according to some policy π t , she will receive reward r(s t , a t , µ t ) and her state will evolve under a controlled stochastic dynamics of a mean-field type P (·|s t , a t , µ t ). Here the policy π t depends on both the current state s t and the current population state distribution µ t such that π : S × P(S) → P(A).
General MFG (GMFG)
In the classical MFG setting, the reward and the dynamic for each player are known. They depend only on the state of the player s t , the action of this particular player a t , and the population state distribution µ t . In contrast, in the motivating auction example, the reward and the dynamic are unknown; they rely on the actions of all players, as well as on s t and µ t .
We therefore define the following general MFG (GMFG) framework. At time t, after the representative player chooses her action a t according to some policy π : S × P(S) → P(A), she will receive a (possibly random) reward r(s t , a t , L t ) and her state will evolve according to P (·|s t , a t , L t ),
where r and P are possibly unknown. We assume that r is a.s. non-negative and uniformly bounded (i.e., there exists some constant C > 0 such that 0 ≤ r(s, a, L) ≤ C a.s. for any s, a and L). This assumption can be relaxed to sub-Gaussian or sub-exponential tail bounds on the reward, but we assume a.s. boundedness for the clarity of the analysis. The objective of the player is to solve the following control problem:
(GMFG)
Here, L L L := {L t } ∞ t=0 , with L t = P st,at ∈ P(S ×A) the joint distribution of the state and the action (i.e., the population state-action pair). L t has marginal distributions α t for the population action and µ t for the population state. Notice that {L t } ∞ t=0 could be time dependent. That is, an infinite-time horizon MFG could still have time-dependent NE solutions due to the mean information process in the MFG. This is fundamentally different from the theory of MDP where the optimal control, if exists uniquely, would be time independent in an infinite time horizon setting.
In this paper, we will analyze the existence of NE to GMFG. For ease of exposition, we will first focus on stationry NEs. Accordingly, for notational brevity, we abbreviate π π π = {π} ∞ t=0 and L L L = {L} ∞ t=0 as π and L, respectively. We will show in the end how this stationary constraint can be relaxed (cf. §8).
Definition 2.1 (Stationary NE for GMFGs). In (GMFG), a player-population profile (π , L ) is called a stationary NE if 1. (Single player side) For any policy π and any initial state s ∈ S,
2. (Population side) P st,at = L for all t ≥ 0, where {s t , a t } ∞ t=0 is the dynamics under the policy π starting from s 0 ∼ µ , with a t ∼ π (s t , µ ), s t+1 ∼ P (·|s t , a t , L ), and µ being the population state marginal of L .
The single player side condition captures the optimality of π , when the population side is fixed. The population side condition ensures the "consistency" of the solution: it guarantees that the state and action distribution flow of the single player does match the population state and action sequence L L L := {L } ∞ t=0 .
A toy example. Take a two-state dynamic system with two choices of controls. The state space S = {0, 1}, the action space A = {L, R}. Here the action L means to move left and R means to move right. The dynamic of the representative agent in the mean-field system {s t } t≥1 goes as follows: if the agent is in state s t and she takes action a t = L at time t, then s t+1 = 0; if she takes action a t = R, then s t+1 = 1. At the end of each round, the agent will receive a reward −W 2 (µ t , B)−W 2 (β t (s t , ·), B), which depends on all agents, where W 2 is the 2 -Wasserstein distance. Here µ t (·) denotes the state distribution of the mean-field population at time t, β t (s, ·) := L t (s, ·)/µ t (s) denotes the action distribution of the population in state s (s = 0, 1) at time t (set β t (s, ·) := (0.5, 0.5) when µ t (s) = 0), and B is a given Binomial distribution with parameter p (0 < p < 1).
Note that −W 2 (µ, B) ≤ 0 for any distribution µ over S. Similarly, −W 2 (α, B) ≤ 0 for any distribution α over A. Hence for each policy π π π, given population distribution flow L L L = {L t } ∞ t=1 ,
and
It is easy to check that the stationary mean-field solution is µ * = (1 − p, p) and π * (s) = (1 − p, p) (s = 0, 1). And L is defined with L (s, a) = µ (s)π (s, a) for any s ∈ S, a ∈ A, accordingly. In this case, the corresponding optimal value function is defined as
Solution for GMFGs
We now establish the existence and uniqueness of the stationary NE to (GMFG), by generalizing the classical fixed-point approach for MFGs to this GMFG setting. (See [28] and [34] for the classical case.) It consists of three steps.
Step A. Fix L, (GMFG) becomes the classical single-player optimization problem. Indeed, with L fixed, the population state distribution µ is also fixed, and hence the space of admissible policies is reduced to the single-player case. Solving (GMFG) is now reduced to finding a policy π L ∈ Π := {π | π : S → P(A)} to maximize
Notice that with L fixed, one can safely suppress the dependency on µ in the admissible policies. Now given this fixed L and the solution π L to the above optimization problem, one can define a mapping from the fixed population distribution L to a chosen optimal randomized policy sequence. That is,
such that π L = Γ 1 (L). Note that this π L satisfies the single player side condition in Definition 2.1 for the population state-action pair L,
for any policy π and any initial state s ∈ S.
As in the MFG literature [28] , a feedback regularity condition is needed for analyzing Step A. Assumption 1. There exists a constant d 1 ≥ 0, such that for any L, L ∈ P(S × A),
where D(π, π ) := sup s∈S W 1 (π(s), π (s)),
and W 1 is the 1 -Wasserstein distance (a.k.a. earth mover distance) between probability measures [17, 44, 50] .
Step B. Given π L obtained from Step A, update the initial L to L following the controlled dynamics P (·|s t , a t , L). Accordingly, for any admissible policy π ∈ Π and a joint population state-action pair L ∈ P(S×A), define a mapping Γ 2 : Π × P(S × A) → P(S × A) as follows:
where a 1 ∼ π(s 1 ), s 1 ∼ µP (·|·, a 0 , L), a 0 ∼ π(s 0 ), s 0 ∼ µ, and µ is the population state marginal of L.
One needs a standard assumption in this step.
Assumption 2. There exist constants d 2 , d 3 ≥ 0, such that for any admissible policies π, π 1 , π 2 and joint distributions L, L 1 , L 2 ,
Step C. Repeat Step A and Step B until L matches L. This step is to ensure the population side condition. To ensure the convergence of the combined step one and step two, it suffices if Γ : P(S × A) → P(S × A) with Γ(L) := Γ 2 (Γ 1 (L), L) is a contractive mapping under the W 1 distance. Then by the Banach fixed point theorem and the completeness of the related metric spaces (cf. Appendix A), there exists a unique stationary NE of the GMFG. That is, Theorem 1 (Existence and Uniqueness of stationary GMFG solution). Given Assumptions 1 and 2, and assume d 1 d 2 + d 3 < 1. Then there exists a unique stationary NE to (GMFG).
Proof. [Proof of Theorem 1] First by Definition 2.1 and the definitions of Γ i (i = 1, 2), (π, L) is a stationary NE iff L = Γ(L) = Γ 2 (Γ 1 (L), L) and π = Γ 1 (L), where Γ(L) = Γ 2 (Γ 1 (L), L). This indicates that for any L 1 , L 2 ∈ P(S × A),
And since d 1 d 2 + d 3 ∈ [0, 1), by the Banach fixed-point theorem, we conclude that there exists a unique fixed-point of Γ, or equivalently, a unique stationary MFG solution to (GMFG).
Remark 1 (Extension to the non-stationary setting). Theorem 1 can be extended to a non-stationary setting. See §8 for the corresponding problem formulation, equilibrium definition, and existence for the non-stationary GMFG.
Remark 2. Assumptions 1 and 2 can be more explicit in specific problem settings. For instance, when the action space is convex, explicit conditions on P and r have been described for the meanfield linear-quadratic regulator (LQR) settings [14] . The results are later generalized beyond the LQR settings in [2] . When the action space is finite, the following lemma explicitly characterizes Assumption 2.
Lemma 2. Suppose that max s,a,L,s P (s |s, a, L) ≤ c 1 , and that P (s |s, a, ·) is c 2 -Lipschitz in W 1 , i.e., |P (s |s, a, L 1 ) − P (s |s, a,
Then in Assumption 2, d 2 and d 3 can be chosen as
, respectively. Here d min (A) = min a =a ∈A a − a 2 , which is guaranteed to be positive when A is finite.
RL Algorithms for (stationary) GMFGs
In this section, we design algorithms for the GMFG. Since the reward and transition distributions are unknown, this is simultaneously learning the system and finding the NE of the game. We will focus on the case with finite state and action spaces, i.e., |S|, |A| < ∞. We will look for stationary (time independent) NEs. This stationarity property enables developing appropriate stationary reinforcement learning algorithms, suitable for an infinite time horizon game. Instead of knowing the transition probability P and the reward r explicitly, the algorithms we propose only assume access to a simulator oracle, which is described below, see [43, 51] .
Simulator oracle. For any policy π ∈ Π, given the current state s ∈ S, for any population distribution L, one can obtain a sample of the next state s ∼ P (·|s, π(s), L), a reward r = r(s, π(s), L), and the next population distribution L = P s ,π(s ) . For brevity, we denote the simulator as (s , r, L ) = G(s, π, L). This simulator oracle can be weakened to fit the N -player setting, see Section 5.
In the following, we begin with a naive algorithm that simply combines the three-step fixed point approach with general RL algorithms, and demonstrate that this algorithm can be unstable ( §4.1). We then propose some smoothing and projection techniques to resolve the issue ( §4.2). In §4.3 and §4.4, we design general value-based and policy-based RL algorithms, and establish the corresponding convergence and complexity results. These two algorithms include most of the RL algorithms in the literature. We then illustrate by two concrete examples based on Q-learning and trust-region policy optimization algorithms.
Naive algorithm and its issue
We follow the three-step fixed-point approach described in §3. Notice the fact that with L fixed,
Step A in §3 becomes a standard learning problem for an infinite horizon discounted MDP. More specifically, the MDP to be solved is M L = (S, A, P L , r L , γ), where P L (s |s, a) = P (s |s, a, L) and r L (s, a) = r(s, a, L). Denote the optimal value function of the MDP as V M , and the optimal Q-function as Q M , and also use the shorthand V L = V M L and Q L = Q M L for notational brevity. Similarly, denote V π M , Q π M , V π L and Q π L for the value functions and Q-functions corresponding to a specific policy π.
Given the optimal Q-function Q L , one can obtain an optimal policy π L with π L (s) = argmax-e(Q L (s, ·)). Here the argmax-e operator is defined so that actions with equal maximum Q-values would have equal probabilities to be selected. Hereafter, we specify Γ 1 as a mapping to the aforementioned choice of the optimal policy, i.e., the s-component Γ 1 (L) s = argmax-e(Q L (s, ·)) for any s ∈ S.
The population update in Step B can then be directly obtained from the simulator G following policy π L . Combining these two steps leads to the following naive algorithm (Algorithm 1).
Algorithm 1 Naive Reinforcement Learning for GMFGs
1: Input: Initial population state-action pair L 0 2: for k = 0, 1, · · · do 3:
Obtain the optimal Q-function Q k (s, a) = Q L k (s, a) of an MDP with dynamics P L k (s |s, a) and reward distributions R L k (s, a).
4:
Compute π k ∈ Π with π k (s) = argmax-e (Q k (s, ·)).
5:
Sample s ∼ µ k , where µ k is the population state marginal of L k , and obtain L k+1 from G(s, π k , L k ). 6: end for Unfortunately, in practice, one cannot obtain the exact optimal Q-function Q k . In fact, invoking any commonly used RL algorithm with the simulator G leads to an approximationQ k of the actual Q k . This approximation error is then magnified by the discontinuous and sensitive argmax-e, which eventually leads to an unstable algorithm (see Figure 4 for an example of divergence). To see why argmax-e is not continuous, consider the following simple example. Let x = (1, 1), then argmax-e(x) = (1/2, 1/2). For any > 0, let y = (1, 1 − ), then argmax-e(y ) = (1, 0). Hence lim →0 y = x but lim →0 argmax-e(y ) = argmax-e(x).
This instability issue will be addressed by introducing smoothing and projection techniques.
Restoring stability
Smoothing techniques. To address the instability caused, we replace argmax-e with a smooth function that is a good approximation to argmax-e while being Lipschitz continuous. One such candidate is the softmax operator softmax c : R n → R n , with
for some positive constant c. The resulting policies are sometimes called Boltzmann policies, and are widely used in the literature of reinforcement learning [4, 23] .
The softmax operator can be generalized to a wide class of operators. In fact, for positive constants c, c > 0, one can consider a parametrized family F c,c ⊆ {f c,c : R n → R n } of all "smoothed" argmax-e's, i.e., all f c,c : R n → R n that satisfies the following two conditions:
• Condition 2: f c,c is a good approximation of argmax-e, i.e.,
..,n x i , and δ := ∞ when all x j are equal.
Notice that F c,c is closed under convex combinations, i.e., if f c,c , g c,c ∈ F c,c , then for any λ ∈ [0, 1], λf c,c + (1 − λ)g c,c' also satisfies the two conditions. Hence F c,c is convex.
To have a better idea of what F c,c looks like, we describe a subset B c,c of F c,c consisting of the generalized softmax operator softmax h : R n → R n , defined as
where
In particular, if h(x) ≡ cx for some constant c > 0, the operator reduces to the classical softmax operator, in which case we overload the notation to write softmax h as softmax c . This operator is Lipschitz continuous and close to the argmax-e (see Lemmas 12 and 13 in the Appendix), and in particular one can show that B c,c ⊆ F c,c . As a result, even though smoothed (e.g., Boltzmann) policies are not optimal, the difference between the smoothed and the optimal one can always be controlled by choosing a function h with appropriate parameters c, c . Note that other smoothing operators (e.g., Mellowmax [4] , which is a softmax operator with time-varying and problem dependent temperatures) may also be considered.
Error control in updating L. Given the sub-optimality of the smoothed policy, one needs to characterize the difference between the optimal policy and the non-optimal ones. In particular, one can define the action gap between the best and the second best actions in terms of the Q-value as
Action gap is important for approximation algorithms [5] , and is closely related to the problemdependent bounds for regret analysis in reinforcement learning and multi-armed bandits, and advantage learning algorithms including A3C [39] . The problem is: in order for the learning algorithm to converge in terms of L (Theorems 3 and 8), one needs to ensure a definite differentiation between the optimal policy and the sub-optimal ones. This is problematic as the infimum of δ s (L) over an infinite number of L can be 0. To address this, the population distribution at step k, say L k , needs to be projected to a finite grid, called -net. The relation between the -net and action gaps is as follows:
For any > 0, there exist a positive function φ( ) and an -net S := {L (1) , . . . , L (N ) } ⊆ P(S × A), with the properties that min i=1,...,N d T V (L, L (i) ) ≤ for any L ∈ P(S × A), and that max a ∈A Q L (i) (s, a )−Q L (i) (s, a) ≥ φ( ) for any i = 1, . . . , N , s ∈ S, and any a / ∈ argmax a∈A Q L (i) (s, a).
Here the existence of -nets is trivial due to the compactness of the probability simplex P(S × A), and the existence of φ( ) comes from the finiteness of the action set A.
In practice, φ( ) often takes the form of D α with D > 0 and the exponent α > 0 characterizing the decay rate of the action gaps. In general, experiments are robust with respect to the choice of -net.
In the next two sections, we propose value based and policy based algorithms for learning GMFG.
Value-based algorithms
We start by introducing the following definition.
Definition 4.1 (Value-based Guarantee). For an arbitrary MDP M, we say that an algorithm has a value-based guarantee with parameters {C
samples from the simulator oracle G, with probability at least 1 − 2δ, it outputs an approximate
Here the norm · ∞ is understood element-wisely.
GMF-V
We now state the first main algorithm (Algorithm 2). It applies to any algorithm Alg with a value-based guarantee.
Apply Alg to find the approximate Q-functionQ
4:
Compute π k (s) = f c,c (Q k (s, ·)).
5:
Sample s ∼ µ k (µ k is the population state marginal of L k ), obtainL k+1 from G(s, π k , L k ).
6:
Find
. For computational tractability, it is sufficient to choose S as a truncation grid so that projection ofL k onto the -net reduces to truncatingL k to a certain number of digits. For instance, in experiments in §7, the number of digits is chosen to be 4. Appropriate choices of the hyper-parameters c, c , and tolerances k , δ k (k ≥ 0) are given in Theorems 3. Our experiment shows the algorithm is robust with respect to these hyper-parameters.
In the special case when the rewards r L and transition dynamics P L are known, one can for example replace the Alg step in the above Algorithm 2 by value iteration, resulting in GMF-VI (Algorithm 8) in Appendix C.
We next establish the convergence of the above GMF-V algorithm to an approximate Nash equilibrium of (GMFG), with complexity analysis.
Theorem 3 (Convergence and complexity of GMF-V). Assume the same assumptions as Theorem 1. Suppose that Alg has a value-based guarantee with parameters
For any , δ > 0,
Then with probability at least 1 − 2δ,
Here K ,η := 2 max (η /c) −1/η , log d ( / max{diam(S)diam(A), c}) + 1 is the number of outer iterations, and the constant C 0 is independent of δ, and η. Moreover, the total number of samples T =
The proof of Theorem 3 (in the Appendix) depends on the Lipschitz continuity of the smoothing operator f c,c , the closeness between f c,c and the argmax-e (Lemma 13 in the Appendix), and the complexity of Alg provided by the value-based guarantee.
GMF-V-Q: GMF-V with Q-learning
As an example of the GMF-V algorithm, we describe algorithm GMF-V-Q, a Q-learning based GMF-V algorithm.
For an MDP M = (S, A, P, r, γ), the Q-learning algorithm approximates the value iteration by stochastic approximation. At each step l with the state s and an action a, the system reaches state s according to the controlled dynamics and the Q-function approximation Q l is updated according to
where the step size β l (s, a) can be chosen as ( [13] )
with h ∈ (1/2, 1). Here #(s, a, l) is the number of times up to time l that one visits the stateaction pair (s, a). The algorithm then proceeds to choose action a based on Q l+1 with appropriate exploration strategies, including the -greedy strategy. The validity of GMF-V-Q is ensured by the following value-based guarantee for Q-learning.
Proposition 4 (Value-based guarantee of Q-learning algorithm). The Q-learning algorithm with appropriate choices of step-sizes (cf. (18)) satisfies the value-based guarantee with the following parameters (cf. Lemma 5 below for detailed specifications of the hyper-parameters L, V max , h, β and p):
The corresponding Q-learning based algorithm with the standard softmax operator is GMF-V-Q (Algorithm 3), which will be used in the experiment ( §7).
Algorithm 3 Q-learning for GMFGs (GMF-V-Q)
1: Input: Initial L 0 , -net S , tolerances k , δ k > 0, k = 0, 1, . . . . 2: for k = 0, 1, · · · do 3:
Perform Q-learning with hyper-parameters in Lemma 5 for T k = T M L k ( k , δ k ) iterations to find the approximate Q-functionQ k =Q T k of the MDP M L k .
4:
Compute π k ∈ Π with π k (s) = softmax c (Q k (s, ·)).
5:
6:
Find L k+1 = Proj S (L k+1 ) 7: end for
The value-based guarantee of Q-learning in Proposition 4 can be obtained from the following sample complexity result.
Lemma 5 ([13] : sample complexity of Q-learning). For an MDP, say M = (S, A, P, r, γ), suppose that the Q-learning algorithm takes step-sizes (18) . Also suppose that the covering time of the state-action pairs is bounded by L with probability at least 1 − p for some p ∈ (0, 1). Then Q T M (δ, ) − Q ∞ ≤ with probability at least 1 − 2δ. HereQ T is the T -th update in Q-learning, Q is the (optimal) Q-function, and
where β = (1 − γ)/2, V max = R max /(1 − γ), and R max is such that a.s. 0 ≤ r(s, a) ≤ R max .
Here the covering time L of a state-action pair sequence is defined to be the number of steps needed to visit all state-action pairs starting from any arbitrary state-action pair. Also notice that the l ∞ norm above is defined in an element-wise sense, i.e., for M ∈ R |S|×|A| , we have M ∞ = max s∈S,a∈A |M (s, a)|. Corollary 6. Assume the same assumptions as Theorem 1, Q-learning satisfies the condition in Theorem 3, implying in the convergence of algorithm GMF-V-Q.
Policy-based algorithms
In addition to algorithms with value-based guarantees (cf. Definition 4.1), there are also numerous algorithms with policy-based guarantees, defined below. 
, if for any , δ > 0, after obtaining
GMF-P
Before we present the policy-based RL algorithms, we first make a connection between policy-based and value-based guarantees. For any policy π ∈ Π, definê
where r i ∼ r(s, a), s i ∼ P (·|s, a) are i.i.d. (i = 1, . . . , m), andV π M,l (s i ) are the discounted total rewards of independent trajectories starting from s i truncated at the l-th step, following policy π. We have the following lemma (the proof is in the appendix).
Lemma 7. Suppose that the algorithm Alg satisfies a policy-based guarantee with parameters {C
for l = log γ (1−γ) 4 1 2 log 2 δ . Consequently, the algorithm Alg also has a valuebased guarantee with parameters {C
M is some constant multiple of C Algorithm 4 GMF-P(Alg, f c,c ) 1: Input: Initial L 0 , -net S , temperatures c, c > 0, tolerances k , δ k > 0, k = 0, 1, . . . . 2: for k = 0, 1, · · · do 3:
Apply Alg to find the approximate policyπ k = π T k of the MDP M k := M L k , where T k = T M k ( k /2, δ k /2).
4:
.
5:
Compute π k (s) = f c,c (Qπ k M k ,M k ,l k (s, ·)).
6:
7:
Find L k+1 = Proj S (L k+1 ) 8: end for
The above lemma indicates that any algorithm with a policy-based guarantee also satisfies a value-based guarantee with similar parameters. The policy-based algorithm GMF-P (Algorithm 4) makes use of Lemma 7 to select hyper-parameters M and l so that the resultingQ π T M ( ,δ) M,M,l forms a good value-based certificate.
We next show the convergence result for the GMF-P algorithm. The proof follows by combining the proof of Lemma 7 with the proof of Theorem 3.
Theorem 8 (Convergence and complexity of GMF-P). Assume the same assumptions as in Theorem 1. Suppose that Alg has a policy-based guarantee with parameters
Then for any , δ > 0, set δ k = δ/K ,η , k = (k + 1) −(1+η) for some η ∈ (0, 1] (k = 0, . . . , K ,η − 1), and c = c = log(1/ ) φ( ) , 3 with probability at least 1 − 2δ,
where the parameters {C
are defined in Lemma 7. 3 Here again we actually only need c = Ω( log(1/ ) φ( ) ) and c = O( log(1/ ) φ( ) ), and the corresponding result will differ only in some absolute constants.
GMF-P-TRPO: GMF-P with TRPO
A special form of the GMF-P algorithm utilizes the trust region policy optimization (TRPO) algorithm [46, 47] . We call it GMF-P-TRPO.
Sample-based TRPO [47] assumes access to a ν-restart model. That is, it can only access sampled trajectories and restarts according to the distribution ν. Here we pick ν such that
and Unif S is the uniform distribution on set S. Sample-based TRPO samples M 0 trajectories per episode. The initial state s 0 at the beginning of each episode is sampled from ν. In every trajectory m (m = 1, 2, · · · , M 0 ) of the l-th episode, it first samples s m ∼ d π l ν and takes an action a m ∼ Unif A where Unif A is the uniform distribution on the set A. Then, by following the current π l , it estimates Q π l (s m , a m ) using a rollout. Denote this estimate asQ π l (s m , a m , m) and observe that it is (nearly) an unbiased estimator of Q π l (s m , a m ). We assume that each rollout runs sufficiently long so that the bias is sufficiently small. Sample-Based TRPO updates the policy at the end of the l-th episode, by the following proximal problem
where the estimation of the gradient iŝ
Given two policies π 1 and π 2 , we denote their Bregman distance associated with a strongly convex function w as B w (s; π 1 , π 2 ) = B w (π 1 (s), π 2 (s)), where B w (x, y) := w(x) − w(y) − ∇w(y), x − y and π i (s) ∈ P (A) (i = 1, 2). Denote B w (π 1 , π 2 ) ∈ R |S| as the corresponding state-wise vector. Here we consider two common cases for w: when w(x) = 1 2 x 2 2 is the Euclidean distance, B w (x, y) = 1 2 x − y 2 2 ; when w(x) = H(x) is the negative entropy, B w (x, y) = d KL (x||y). We refer to [47, Section 6.2] for more detailed discussion on Sample-based TRPO.
To validate GMF-P-TRPO, we first see that TRPO algorithm satisfies the following policy-based guarantee.
Proposition 9 (Policy-based guarantee of TRPO). Let t l = (1−γ) C ω,1 C √ l+1 , then TRPO algorithm satisfies the policy-based guarantee with the following parameters:
Here C > 0 is the upper bound on the reward function r, C w,1 = |A| in the euclidean case and C w,1 = 1 in the non-euclidean case, C w,2 = 1 for the euclidean case and C w,2 = |A| 2 for the non-euclidean case.
The above guarantee follows from the sample complexity result below by specifying µ := Unif S . Notice that here for any µ ∈ P(S), we define V (µ) := s∈S µ(s)V (s), and similarly V π k (µ) := s∈S µ(s)V π k (s). Lemma 10 (Theorem 5 in [47] : sample complexity of TRPO). Let {π l } l≥0 be the sequence generated by Sample-Based TRPO, using
be the sequence of best achieved values, V N best (µ) := max l=0,1,··· ,N V π l (µ), where µ ∈ P(S). Then with probability greater than 1 − δ for every > 0, the following holds for all N ≥ 1:
Note that [47, Theorem 5] has both regularized version and unregularized version of TRPO. Here we only adopt the unregularized version which fits the framework of Algorithm 4. For more materials on regularized MDPs and reinforcement learning, we refer the readers to [40, 16, 11] .
Corollary 11. Assume the same assumptions as Theorem 1, TRPO algorithm satisfies the condition in Theorem 8, implying the convergence of algorithm GMF-P-TRPO.
Applications to N -player Games
In this section, we discuss a potential application of our modeling and approach to N -player settings. To this end, we consider extensions of Algorithms 2 and 4 with weaker assumptions on the simulator access. In particular, we weaken the simulator oracle assumption in §4 as follows.
Weak simulator oracle. For each player i, given any policy π ∈ Π, the current state s i ∈ S, for any empirical population state-action distribution L N , one can obtain a sample of the next state s i ∼ P L N (·|s i , π(s i )) = P (·|s i , π(s i ), L N ) and a reward r = r L N (s i , π(s i )) = r(s i , π(s i ), L N ). For brevity, we denote the simulator as (s i , r) = G W (s i , π, L N ).
We say that L N is an empirical population state-action distribution of N -players if for each s ∈ S, a ∈ A, L N (s, a) = 1 N N i=1 I s i =s,a i =a for some state-action profile of {s i , a i } N i=1 . Equivalently, this holds if N L N (s, a) is a non-negative integer for each s ∈ S, a ∈ A, and s,a L N (s, a) = 1. We denote the set of empirical population state-action distributions as Emp N .
RL algorithms with access only to G W . Compared to the original simulator oracle G, the weak simulator G W only accepts empirical population state-action distributions as inputs, and does not directly output the next (empirical) population state-action distribution.
To make use of the simulator G W , we modify Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 4 to algorithms (Algorithms 5 and 6). In particular, see Step 6 in Algorithm 5 and Step 7 in Algorithm 6 for generating empirical distributions from simulator G W .
One can observe that Emp N already serves as an 1/N -net. So one can directly use it without additional projections. The definition of L k also makes sure that L k ∈ Emp N as required for the input of the weaker simulator.
Convergence results similar to Theorems 3 and 8 can be obtained for Algorithms 5 and Apply Alg to find the approximate Q-functionQ
4:
Compute π k (s) = f c,c (Q k (s, ·) ).
for i = 1, 2, · · · , N do 6: Apply Alg to find the approximate policyπ k = π T k of the MDP
5:
Compute ·) ). for i = 1, 2, · · · , N do 6 Proof of the main results
Proof of Lemma 2
In this section, we provide the proof of Lemma 2.
Proof. [Proof of Lemma 2] We begin by noticing that L = Γ 2 (π, L) can be expanded and computed as follows: 
where µ is the state marginal distribution of L.
Now by the inequalities (50), we have 
Similarly, we have 
This completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 7
In this section, we provide the proof of Lemma 7.
Proof. [Proof of Lemma 7] For notation simplicity, in the following analysis we fix the MDP and omit the the notation M. First, notice that if V (s ) − V π T ( ,δ) (s ) ≤ , then
for any s ∈ S, a ∈ A. Let's now fix an arbitrary pair of , δ > 0. Since we have assumed that r is almost surely uniformly bounded by some constant C > 0. Hence 0 ≤V π T ( ,δ) l (s i ) ≤ C/(1 − γ). And if we define X i := r i + γV π T ( ,δ) l (s i ), then X i 's are independent and almost surely bounded byC := C/(1 − γ).
Below we use the shorthandQ M,l =Q π T ( ,δ) M,l for notational convenience. By the Hoeffding inequality, we have
Now notice that
Also notice that for any s ∈ S,
Combining (28) and (29), we have
Since we have assumed that Alg satisfies a policy-based guarantee, for any , δ > 0, after obtaining T ( /2, δ/2) samples, we have
which, combined with (26), leads to
Finally, we take l = log γ
2δ. And noticing that the computation ofQ M,l requires an additional M (l + 2) number of samples, we conclude that Alg also has a value-based guarantee with parameters
with the parameters as specified in the claim of the lemma. This completes our proof.
Proof of Theorems 3 and 8
The proofs of Theorems 3 and 8 rely on the following lemmas.
Then the softmax function softmax h is c-Lipschitz, i.e., softmax h (x)−softmax h (y) 2 ≤ c x−y 2 for any x, y ∈ R n .
Proof. [Proof of Lemma 12] Notice that softmax h (x) = softmax(h(x)), where
is the standard softmax function andh(x) i = h(x i ) for i = 1, . . . , n. Now since softmax is 1-Lipschitz continuous (cf. [15, Proposition 4] ), andh is c-Lipschitz continuous, we conclude that the composition softmax •h is c-Lipschitz continuous.
Notice that for a finite set X ⊆ R k and any two (discrete) distributions ν, ν over X , we have
where in computing the 1 -norm, ν, ν are viewed as vectors of length |X |. Lemma 12 implies that for any x, y ∈ R |X | , when softmax c (x) and softmax c (y) are viewed as probability distributions over X , we have
Then the distance between the softmax h and the argmax-e mapping is bounded by
where δ = x max − max x j <xmax x j , x max = max i=1,...,n x i , and δ := ∞ when all x j are equal.
Similar to Lemma 12, Lemma 13 implies that for any x ∈ R |X | , viewing softmax h (x) as probability distributions over X leads to W 1 (softmax h (x), argmax-e(x)) ≤ diam(X )|X | exp(−cδ). Lemma 13] Without loss of generality, assume that x 1 = x 2 = · · · = x m = max i=1,...,n x i = x > x j for all m < j ≤ n. Then
Proof. [Proof of
We are now ready to present the proofs of Theorems 3 and 8.
Proof. [Proof of Theorem 3] Here we prove the case when we are using GMF-V and Alg has a valuebased guarantee. DefineΓ k 1 (L k ) := softmax f c,c Q k . In the following, π = softmax f c,c (Q L ) is understood as the policy π with π(s) = softmax f c,c (Q L (s, ·)). Let L be the population state-action pair in a stationary NE of (GMFG). Then π k =Γ k 1 (L k ). Denoting d :
Since L k ∈ S by the projection step, by Lemma 13 and the algorithm Alg has a policy-based guarantee, with the choice of T k = T M L k (δ k , k )), we have, with probability at least 1 − 2δ k ,
Finally, with probability at least 1 − 2δ k ,
This implies that with probability at least 1 − 2 K−1 k=0 δ k ,
Since k is summable, we have sup k≥0 k < ∞,
Now plugging in K = K ,η , with the choice of δ k and c = log(1/ ) φ( ) , and noticing that d ∈ [0, 1), we have with probability at least 1 − 2δ,
Setting k = (k + 1) −(1+η) , then when K ,η ≥ 2(log d ( /c) + 1),
In summary, if K ,η = 2 max{(η /c) −1/η , log d ( / max{diam(S)diam(A), c}) + 1} , then with probability at least 1 − 2δ,
Finally, if we are using GMF-V and have assumed that Alg satisfies a value-based guarantee with parameters {C
, plugging in k and δ k into T M L (δ k , k ), and noticing that k≤K ,η and
Proof.
[Proof of Theorem 8] Now If we are using GMF-P and have assumed that Alg has a policybased guarantee, then by Lemma 7 (and its proof, which provides a construction of an approximate Q-function satisfying a value-based guarantee), with our choice of M k , l k (k ≥ 0), by Lemma 7) we have
That is, if this player does not win the bid, the budget will remain the same. If she wins and has enough money to pay, her budget will decrease from s t to s t − a M t . However, if she wins but does not have enough money, her budget will be 0 after the payment and there will be a penalty in the reward function. Note that in this game, both the rewards r t and the dynamics s t are unknown a priori.
In practice, one often modifies the dynamics of s t+1 with a non-negative random budget fulfillment ∆(s t+1 ) after the auction clearing [3, 21] , such thatŝ t+1 = s t+1 + ∆(s t+1 ). One may see some particular choices of ∆(s t+1 ) in the experiments later in this section.
Repeated auction as an N -player game. We also consider an N -player game version of the repeated auction game, which is the GMFG version described above with an N -player weak simulator oracle as described in §5. In this setting, accordingly, we test the performance of GMF-VW-Q, which is GMF-VW (Algorithm 5) with Q-learning and the standard softmax operator (cf. Algorithm 7). 
4:
for i = 1, 2, · · · , N do 6: Performance evaluation in the GMFG setting. Our experiment shows that the GMF-V-Q Algorithm is efficient and robust, and learns well.
Convergence and stability of GMF-V-Q. GMF-V-Q is efficient and robust. First, GMF-V-Q converges after about 10 outer iterations; secondly, as the number of inner iterations increases, the error decreases ( Figure 2) ; and finally, the convergence is robust with respect to both the change of number of states and the initial population distribution (Figure 3) . In contrast, the Naive algorithm does not converge even with 10000 inner iterations, and the joint distribution L t keeps fluctuating (Figure 4 ).
Learning accuracy of GMF-V-Q. GMF-V-Q learns well. Its learning accuracy is tested against its special form GMF-VI (Appendix C), with the latter assuming a known distribution of conversion rate v and the dynamics P for the budget s. The relative L 2 distance between the Q-tables of these two algorithms is ∆Q :=
= 0.098879. This implies that GMF-V-Q learns the true GMFG solution with 90-percent accuracy with 10000 inner iterations.
The heatmap in Figure 1(a) is the Q-table for GMF-V-Q Algorithm after 20 outer iterations. Within each outer iteration, there are T GMF-V-Q k = 10000 inner iterations. The heatmap in Figure 1(b) is the Q-table for GMF-V-Q Algorithm after 20 outer iterations. Within each outer iteration, there are T GMF-VI k = 5000 inner iterations. Comparison with existing algorithms for N -player games. To test the effectiveness of GMF-VW-Q for approximating N -player games, we next compare GMF-VW-Q with IL algorithm and MF-Q algorithm. IL algorithm [49] considers N independent players and each player solves a decentralized reinforcement learning problem ignoring other players in the system. The MF-Q algorithm [53] extends the NASH-Q Learning algorithm for the N -player game introduced in [26] , adds the aggregate actions (ā a a −i = j =i a j N −1 ) from the opponents, and works for the class of games where the interactions are only through the average actions of N players. Performance metric. We adopt the following metric to measure the difference between a given policy π and an NE (here 0 > 0 is a safeguard, and is taken as 0.1 in the experiments):
s∈S N max π i V i (s, (π π π −i , π i )) − V i (s, π π π) | max π i V i (s, (π π π −i , π i ))| + 0 .
Clearly C(π π π) ≥ 0, and C(π π π * ) = 0 if and only if π π π * is an NE. Policy arg max π i V i (s, (π π π −i , π i )) is called the best response to π π π −i . A similar metric without normalization has been adopted in [42] . Our experiment ( Figure 5) shows that GMF-VW-Q is superior in terms of convergence rate, accuracy, and stability for approximating an N -player game: GMF-VW-Q converges faster than IL and MF-Q, with the smallest error, and with the lowest variance, as -net improves the stability.
For instance, when N = 20, IL Algorithm converges with the largest error 0.220. The error from MF-Q is 0.101, smaller than IL but still bigger than the error from GMF-VW-Q. The GMF-VW-Q converges with the lowest error 0.065. Moreover, as N increases, the error of GMF-VW-Q deceases while the errors of both MF-Q and IL increase significantly. As |S| and |A| increase, GMF-VW-Q is robust with respect to this increase of dimensionality, while both MF-Q and IL clearly suffer from the increase of the dimensionality with decreased convergence rate and accuracy. Therefore, GMF-VW-Q is more scalable than IL and MF-Q, when the system is complex and the number of players N is large.
Extension: Existence and uniqueness for non-stationary NE of GMFGs
In this section, we describe the setting of non-stationary NE for GMFGs and establish the corresponding results of existence and uniqueness.
Definition 8.1 (NE for GMFGs). In (GMFG), a player-population profile (π π π , L L L ) := ({π t } ∞ t=0 , {L t } ∞ t=0 ) is called an NE if 1. (Single player side) Fix L L L , for any policy sequence π π π := {π t } ∞ t=0 and initial state s ∈ S, V (s, π π π , L L L ) ≥ V (s, π π π, L L L ) .
2. (Population side) P st,at = L t for all t ≥ 0, where {s t , a t } ∞ t=0 is the dynamics under the policy sequence π π π starting from s 0 ∼ µ 0 , with a t ∼ π t (s t , µ t ), s t+1 ∼ P (·|s t , a t , L t ), and µ t being the population state marginal of L t .
Step 1. Fix L L L := {L t } ∞ t=0 , (GMFG) becomes the classical optimization problem. Indeed, with L L L fixed, the population state distribution sequence µ µ µ := {µ t } ∞ t=0 is also fixed, hence the space of admissible policies is reduced to the single-player case. Solving (GMFG) is now reduced to finding a policy sequence π t,L L L ∈ Π := {π | π : S → P(A)} over all admissible π π π L L L = {π t,L L L } ∞ t=0 , to maximize V (s, π π π L L L , L L L) := E ∞ t=0 γ t r(s t , a t , L t )|s 0 = s , subject to s t+1 ∼ P (s t , a t , L t ), a t ∼ π t,L L L (s t ).
Notice that with L L L fixed, one can safely suppress the dependency on µ t in the admissible policies. Moreover, given this fixed L L L sequence and the solution π π π L L L := {π t,L L L } ∞ t=0 , one can define a mapping from the fixed population distribution sequence L L L to an optimal randomized policy sequence. That is,
, such that π π π L L L = Γ 1 (L L L). Note that this π π π L L L sequence satisfies the single player side condition in Definition 8.1 for the population state-action pair sequence L L L. That is, V s, π π π L L L , L L L ≥ V (s, π π π, L L L) , for any policy sequence π π π = {π t } ∞ t=0 and any initial state s ∈ S. Accordingly, a similar feedback regularity condition is needed in this step. 
where D(π π π, π π π ) := sup s∈S W 1 (π π π(s), π π π (s)) = sup s∈S sup t∈N W 1 (π t (s), π t (s)),
and W 1 is the 1 -Wasserstein distance between probability measures.
Step 2. Based on the analysis in Step A and π π π L L L = {π t,L L L } ∞ t=0 , update the initial sequence L L L to L L L following the controlled dynamics P (·|s t , a t , L t ).
Accordingly, for any admissible policy sequence π π π ∈ {Π} ∞ t=0 and a joint population state-action pair sequence L L L ∈ {P(S × A)} ∞ t=0 , define a mapping Γ 2 :
as follows:
Γ 2 (π π π, L L L) :=L L L = {P st,at } ∞ t=0 ,
where s t+1 ∼ µ t P (·|·, a t , L t ), a t ∼ π t (s t ), s 0 ∼ µ 0 , and µ t is the population state marginal of L t . One also needs a similar assumption in this step.
Assumption 4. There exist constants d 2 , d 3 ≥ 0, such that for any admissible policy sequences π π π, π π π 1 , π π π 2 and joint distribution sequences L L L, L L L 1 , L L L 2 , W 1 (Γ 2 (π π π 1 , L L L), Γ 2 (π π π 2 , L L L)) ≤ d 2 D(π π π 1 , π π π 2 ),
W 1 (Γ 2 (π π π, L L L 1 ), Γ 2 (π π π, L L L 2 )) ≤ d 3 W 1 (L L L 1 , L L L 2 ).
Similarly, Assumption 4 can be reduced to Lipschitz continuity and boundedness of the transition dynamics P under certain conditions.
Step 3. Repeat Step A and Step B until L L L matches L L L.
This step is to take care of the population side condition. To ensure the convergence of the combined step A and step B, it suffices if Γ : {P(S × A)} ∞ t=0 → {P(S × A)} ∞ t=0 is a contractive mapping under the W 1 distance, with Γ(L L L) := Γ 2 (Γ 1 (L L L), L L L). Then by the Banach fixed point theorem and the completeness of the related metric spaces, there exists a unique NE to the GMFG.
In summary, we have Theorem 14 (Existence and Uniqueness of GMFG solution). Given Assumptions 3 and 4, and assuming that d 1 d 2 + d 3 < 1, there exists a unique NE to (GMFG).
The proof of Theorem 14 can be established by modifying appropriately the fixed-point approach for the stationary GMFG in Theorem 1.
Algorithm 8 Value Iteration for GMFGs (GMF-VI)
1: Input: Initial L 0 , -net S , subproblem max iterations T k , k = 0, 1, . . . . 2: for k = 0, 1, · · · do 3:
Perform value iteration for T k iterations to find the approximate Q-function Q L k and value function V L k : 4: for t = 1, 2, · · · , T k 5:
for all s ∈ S and s ∈ A Compute a policy π k ∈ Π: π k (s) = softmax c (Q L k (s, ·)).
11:
Sample s ∼ µ k , where µ k is the population state marginal of L k , and obtainL k+1 from G(s, π k , L k ).
12:
Find L k+1 = Proj S (L k+1 ) 13: end for D.2 Adjustment for Algorithm MF-Q.
For MF-Q, [53] assumes all N players have a joint state s. In the auction experiment, we make the following adjustment for MF-Q for computational efficiency and model comparability: each player i makes decision based on her own private state and table Q i is a functional of s i , a i and j =i a j N −1 .
